Entries are in alphabetical order. Some entries are only one line or
one paragraph long. Others run to several paragraphs. I have tried to
put the essential information in the first paragraph so you can skip
the other paragraphs if that seems appropriate.
- 0
- 3DES (Triple DES)
- Using three DES encryptions on a single data
block, with at least two different keys, to get higher security than is
available from a single DES pass. The three-key version of 3DES is the
default encryption algorithm for Linux
FreeS/WAN.
IPsec always does 3DES with three different
keys, as required by RFC 2451. For an explanation of the two-key
variant, see two key triple DES. Both use an
EDE encrypt-decrypt-encrpyt sequence of operations.
Single DES is
insecure.
Double DES is ineffective. Using two 56-bit keys, one might expect an
attacker to have to do 2112 work to break it. In fact, only
257 work is required with a
meet-in-the-middle attack, though a large amount of memory is also
required. Triple DES is vulnerable to a similar attack, but that just
reduces the work factor from the 2168 one might expect to 2
112. That provides adequate protection against
brute force attacks, and no better attack is known.
3DES can be somewhat slow compared to other ciphers. It requires
three DES encryptions per block. DES was designed for hardware
implementation and includes some operations which are difficult in
software. However, the speed we get is quite acceptable for many uses.
See our performance document for
details.
- A
- Active attack
- An attack in which the attacker does not merely eavesdrop (see
passive attack) but takes action to change, delete, reroute, add,
forge or divert data. Perhaps the best-known active attack is
man-in-the-middle. In general,
authentication is a useful defense against active attacks.
- AES
- The Advanced Encryption Standard -- a new
block cipher standard to replace
DES -- developed by NIST, the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology. DES used 64-bit blocks and a
56-bit key. AES ciphers use a 128-bit block and 128, 192 or 256-bit
keys. The larger block size helps resist birthday
attacks while the large key size prevents brute
force attacks.
Fifteen proposals meeting NIST's basic criteria were submitted in
1998 and subjected to intense discussion and analysis, "round one"
evaluation. In August 1999, NIST narrowed the field to five "round two"
candidates:
Three of the five finalists -- Rijndael, Serpent and Twofish -- have
completely open licenses.
In October 2000, NIST announced the winner -- Rijndael.
For more information, see:
AES will be added to a future release of
Linux FreeS/WAN. Likely we will add all three of the finalists with
good licenses. User-written AES patches
are already available.
Adding AES may also require adding stronger hashes,
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512.
- AH
- The IPsec Authentication Header,
added after the IP header. For details, see our
IPsec document and/or RFC 2402.
- Alice and Bob
- A and B, the standard example users in writing on cryptography and
coding theory. Carol and Dave join them for protocols which require
more players.
Bruce Schneier extends these with many others such as Eve the
Eavesdropper and Victor the Verifier. His extensions seem to be in the
process of becoming standard as well. See page 23 of
Applied Cryptography
Alice and Bob have an amusing
biography on the web.
- ARPA
- see DARPA
- ASIO
- Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.
- Asymmetric cryptography
- See public key cryptography.
- Authentication
- Ensuring that a message originated from the expected sender and has
not been altered on route. IPsec uses
authentication in two places:
Outside IPsec, passwords are perhaps the most common authentication
mechanism. Their function is essentially to authenticate the person's
identity to the system. Passwords are generally only as secure as the
network they travel over. If you send a cleartext password over a
tapped phone line or over a network with a packet sniffer on it, the
security provided by that password becomes zero. Sending an encrypted
password is no better; the attacker merely records it and reuses it at
his convenience. This is called a replay attack.
A common solution to this problem is a
challenge-response system. This defeats simple eavesdropping and
replay attacks. Of course an attacker might still try to break the
cryptographic algorithm used, or the random number
generator.
- Automatic keying
- A mode in which keys are automatically generated at connection
establisment and new keys automaically created periodically thereafter.
Contrast with manual keying in which a
single stored key is used.
IPsec uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
to create keys. An authentication
mechansim is required for this. FreeS/WAN normally uses
RSA for this. Other methods supported are discussed in our
advanced configuration document.
Having an attacker break the authentication is emphatically not a
good idea. An attacker that breaks authentication, and manages to
subvert some other network entities (DNS, routers or gateways), can use
a man-in-the middle attack to break the security
of your IPsec connections.
However, having an attacker break the authentication in automatic
keying is not quite as bad as losing the key in manual keying.
- An attacker who reads /etc/ipsec.conf and gets the keys for a
manually keyed connection can, without further effort, read all
messages encrypted with those keys, including any old messages he may
have archived.
- Automatic keying has a property called perfect
forward secrecy. An attacker who breaks the authentication gets
none of the automatically generated keys and cannot immediately read
any messages. He has to mount a successful
man-in-the-middle attack in real time before he can read anything.
He cannot read old archived messages at all and will not be able to
read any future messages not caught by man-in-the-middle tricks.
That said, the secrets used for authentication, stored in
ipsec.secrets(5), should still be protected as tightly as
cryptographic keys.
- B
- Bay Networks
- A vendor of routers, hubs and related products, now a subsidiary of
Nortel. Interoperation between their IPsec products and Linux FreeS/WAN
was problematic at last report; see our
interoperation section.
- benchmarks
- Our default block cipher, triple DES, is slower
than many alternate ciphers that might be used. Speeds achieved,
however, seem adequate for many purposes. For example, the assembler
code from the LIBDES library we use encrypts 1.6
megabytes per second on a Pentium 200, according to the test program
supplied with the library.
For more detail, see our document on
FreeS/WAN performance.
- BIND
- Berkeley Internet Name Daemon, a widely
used implementation of DNS (Domain Name
Service). See our bibliography for a useful
reference. See the BIND home
page for more information and the latest version.
- Birthday attack
- A cryptographic attack based on the mathematics exemplified by the
birthday paradox. This math turns up whenever the question of two
cryptographic operations producing the same result becomes an issue:
Resisting such attacks is part of the motivation for:
- hash algorithms such as SHA and
RIPEMD-160 giving a 160-bit result rather than the 128 bits of
MD4, MD5 and RIPEMD-128.
- AES block ciphers using a 128-bit block instead
of the 64-bit block of most current ciphers
- IPsec using a 32-bit counter for packets sent
on an automatically keyed
SA and requiring that the connection always be rekeyed before the
counter overflows.
- Birthday paradox
- Not really a paradox, just a rather counter-intuitive mathematical
fact. In a group of 23 people, the chance of a least one pair having
the same birthday is over 50%.
The second person has 1 chance in 365 (ignoring leap years) of
matching the first. If they don't match, the third person's chances of
matching one of them are 2/365. The 4th, 3/365, and so on. The total of
these chances grows more quickly than one might guess.
- Block cipher
- A symmetric cipher which operates on
fixed-size blocks of plaintext, giving a block of ciphertext for each.
Contrast with stream cipher. Block ciphers can be
used in various modes when multiple block are to be
encrypted.
DES is among the the best known and widely used
block ciphers, but is now obsolete. Its 56-bit key size makes it
highly insecure today. Triple DES is the
default block cipher for Linux FreeS/WAN
.
The current generation of block ciphers -- such as
Blowfish, CAST-128 and IDEA
-- all use 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys. The next generation,
AES, uses 128-bit blocks and supports key sizes up to 256 bits.
The Block Cipher Lounge
web site has more information.
- Blowfish
- A block cipher using 64-bit blocks and keys of
up to 448 bits, designed by Bruce
Schneier and used in several products.
This is not required by the IPsec RFCs and not
currently used in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- Brute force attack (exhaustive search)
- Breaking a cipher by trying all possible keys. This is always
possible in theory (except against a one-time pad),
but it becomes practical only if the key size is inadequate. For an
important example, see our document on the
insecurity of DES with its 56-bit key. For an analysis of key sizes
required to resist plausible brute force attacks, see
this paper.
Longer keys protect against brute force attacks. Each extra bit in
the key doubles the number of possible keys and therefore doubles the
work a brute force attack must do. A large enough key defeats
any brute force attack.
For example, the EFF's DES Cracker searches a
56-bit key space in an average of a few days. Let us assume an attacker
that can find a 64-bit key (256 times harder) by brute force search in
a second (a few hundred thousand times faster). For a 96-bit key, that
attacker needs 232 seconds, about 135 years. Against a
128-bit key, he needs 232 times that, over 500,000,000,000
years. Your data is then obviously secure against brute force attacks.
Even if our estimate of the attacker's speed is off by a factor of a
million, it still takes him over 500,000 years to crack a message.
This is why
- single DES is now considered
dangerously insecure
- all of the current generation of block ciphers
use a 128-bit or longer key
- AES ciphers support keysizes 128, 192 and 256
bits
- any cipher we add to Linux FreeS/WAN will have at least a
128-bit key
Cautions:
Inadequate keylength always indicates a weak cipher but it
is important to note that adequate keylength does not necessarily
indicate a strong cipher. There are many attacks other than brute
force, and adequate keylength only guarantees resistance to
brute force. Any cipher, whatever its key size, will be weak if design
or implementation flaws allow other attacks.
Also, once you have adequate keylength (somewhere around 90
or 100 bits), adding more key bits make no practical difference
, even against brute force. Consider our 128-bit example above that
takes 500,000,000,000 years to break by brute force. We really don't
care how many zeroes there are on the end of that, as long as the
number remains ridiculously large. That is, we don't care exactly how
large the key is as long as it is large enough.
There may be reasons of convenience in the design of the cipher to
support larger keys. For example Blowfish
allows up to 448 bits and RC4 up to 2048, but beyond
100-odd bits it makes no difference to practical security.
- Bureau of Export Administration
- see BXA
- BXA
- The US Commerce Department's Bureau of Export A
dministration which administers the EAR Export
Administration Regulations controling the export of, among other
things, cryptography.
- C
- CA
- Certification Authority, an entity in a
public key infrastructure that can certify keys by signing them.
Usually CAs form a hierarchy. The top of this hierarchy is called the
root CA.
See Web of Trust for an alternate model.
- CAST-128
- A block cipher using 64-bit blocks and 128-bit
keys, described in RFC 2144 and used in products such as
Entrust and recent versions of PGP.
This is not required by the IPsec RFCs and not
currently used in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- CAST-256
- Entrust's candidate cipher for the
AES standard, largely based on the CAST-128
design.
- CBC mode
- Cipher Block Chaining mode,
a method of using a block cipher in which for each
block except the first, the result of the previous encryption is XORed
into the new block before it is encrypted. CBC is the mode used in
IPsec.
An initialisation vector (IV) must be provided. It
is XORed into the first block before encryption. The IV need not be
secret but should be different for each message and unpredictable.
- CIDR
- Classless Inter-Domain Routing, an
addressing scheme used to describe networks not restricted to the old
Class A, B, and C sizes. A CIDR block is written address/
mask, where address is a 32-bit Internet address. The
first mask bits of address are part of the
gateway address, while the remaining bits designate other host
addresses. For example, the CIDR block 192.0.2.96/27 describes a
network with gateway 192.0.2.96, hosts 192.0.2.96 through 192.0.2.126
and broadcast 192.0.2.127.
FreeS/WAN policy group files accept CIDR blocks of the format
address/[mask], where address may take the
form name.domain.tld. An absent mask is assumed
to be /32.
- Certification Authority
- see CA
- Challenge-response authentication
- An authentication system in which one
player generates a random number, encrypts it and
sends the result as a challenge. The other player decrypts and sends
back the result. If the result is correct, that proves to the first
player that the second player knew the appropriate secret, required for
the decryption. Variations on this technique exist using
public key or symmetric cryptography. Some
provide two-way authentication, assuring each player of the other's
identity.
This is more secure than passwords against two simple attacks:
- If cleartext passwords are sent across the wire (e.g. for telnet),
an eavesdropper can grab them. The attacker may even be able to break
into other systems if the user has chosen the same password for them.
- If an encrypted password is sent, an attacker can record the
encrypted form and use it later. This is called a replay attack.
A challenge-response system never sends a password, either cleartext
or encrypted. An attacker cannot record the response to one challenge
and use it as a response to a later challenge. The random number is
different each time.
Of course an attacker might still try to break the cryptographic
algorithm used, or the random number generator.
- Cipher Modes
- Different ways of using a block cipher when encrypting multiple
blocks.
Four standard modes were defined for DES in
FIPS 81. They can actually be applied with any block cipher.
| ECB | Electronic CodeBook |
encrypt each block independently |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining
| XOR previous block ciphertext into new block plaintext
before encrypting new block |
| CFB | Cipher FeedBack | |
| OFB | Output FeedBack | |
IPsec uses CBC mode since
this is only marginally slower than ECB and is more
secure. In ECB mode the same plaintext always encrypts to the same
ciphertext, unless the key is changed. In CBC mode, this does not
occur.
Various other modes are also possible, but none of them are used in
IPsec.
- Ciphertext
- The encrypted output of a cipher, as opposed to the unencrypted
plaintext input.
- Cisco
- A vendor of routers, hubs and related products. Their IPsec products
interoperate with Linux FreeS/WAN; see our
interop section.
- Client
- This term has at least two distinct uses in discussing IPsec:
- The clients of an IPsec gateway are the machines it
protects, typically on one or more subnets behind the gateway. In this
usage, all the machines on an office network are clients of that
office's IPsec gateway. Laptop or home machines connecting to the
office, however, are not clients of that gateway. They are
remote gateways, running the other end of an IPsec connection. Each of
them is also its own client.
- IPsec client software is used to describe software
which runs on various standalone machines to let them connect to IPsec
networks. In this usage, a laptop or home machine connecting to the
office is a client, and the office gateway is the server.
We generally use the term in the first sense. Vendors of Windows
IPsec solutions often use it in the second. See this
discussion.
- Common Criteria
- A set of international security classifications which are replacing
the old US Rainbow Book standards and similar
standards in other countries.
Web references include this US
government site and this
global home page.
- Conventional cryptography
- See symmetric cryptography
- Collision resistance
- The property of a message digest algorithm
which makes it hard for an attacker to find or construct two inputs
which hash to the same output.
- Copyleft
- see GNU General Public License
- CSE
- Communications Security
Establishment, the Canadian organisation for
signals intelligence.
- D
- DARPA (sometimes just ARPA)
- The US government's Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency. Projects they have funded over the years
have included the Arpanet which evolved into the Internet, the TCP/IP
protocol suite (as a replacement for the original Arpanet suite), the
Berkeley 4.x BSD Unix projects, and Secure DNS.
For current information, see their
web site.
- Denial of service (DoS) attack
- An attack that aims at denying some service to legitimate users of a
system, rather than providing a service to the attacker.
- One variant is a flooding attack, overwhelming the system with too
many packets, to much email, or whatever.
- A closely related variant is a resource exhaustion attack. For
example, consider a "TCP SYN flood" attack. Setting up a TCP connection
involves a three-packet exchange:
- Initiator: Connection please (SYN)
- Responder: OK (ACK)
- Initiator: OK here too
If the attacker puts bogus source information in the first packet,
such that the second is never delivered, the responder may wait a long
time for the third to come back. If responder has already allocated
memory for the connection data structures, and if many of these bogus
packets arrive, the responder may run out of memory.
- Another variant is to feed the system undigestible data, hoping to
make it sick. For example, IP packets are limited in size to 64K bytes
and a fragment carries information on where it starts within that 64K
and how long it is. The "ping of death" delivers fragments that say,
for example, that they start at 60K and are 20K long. Attempting to
re-assemble these without checking for overflow can be fatal.
The two example attacks discussed were both quite effective when
first discovered, capable of crashing or disabling many operating
systems. They were also well-publicised, and today far fewer systems
are vulnerable to them.
- DES
- The Data Encryption Standard, a
block cipher with 64-bit blocks and a 56-bit key. Probably the most
widely used symmetric cipher ever devised. DES
has been a US government standard for their own use (only for
unclassified data), and for some regulated industries such as banking,
since the late 70's. It is now being replaced by AES
.
DES is seriously insecure
against current attacks.
Linux FreeS/WAN does not include DES,
even though the RFCs specify it. We strongly recommend that single
DES not be used.
See also 3DES and DESX,
stronger ciphers based on DES.
- DESX
- An improved DES suggested by Ron Rivest of RSA
Data Security. It XORs extra key material into the text before and
after applying the DES cipher.
This is not required by the IPsec RFCs and not
currently used in Linux FreeS/WAN. DESX
would be the easiest additional transform to add; there would be very
little code to write. It would be much faster than 3DES and almost
certainly more secure than DES. However, since it is not in the RFCs
other IPsec implementations cannot be expected to have it.
- DH
- see Diffie-Hellman
- DHCP
- Dynamic Host C
onfiguration Protocol, a method of assigning
dynamic IP addresses, and providing additional information such as
addresses of DNS servers and of gateways. See this
DHCP resource page.
- Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol
- A protocol that allows two parties without any initial shared secret
to create one in a manner immune to eavesdropping. Once they have done
this, they can communicate privately by using that shared secret as a
key for a block cipher or as the basis for key exchange.
The protocol is secure against all passive attacks
, but it is not at all resistant to active
man-in-the-middle attacks. If a third party can impersonate Bob to
Alice and vice versa, then no useful secret can be created.
Authentication of the participants is a prerequisite for safe
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. IPsec can use any of several
authentication mechanisims. Those supported by FreeS/WAN are
discussed in our configuration
section.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the
discrete logarithm problem and is secure unless someone finds an
efficient solution to that problem.
Given a prime p and generator g (explained
under discrete log below), Alice:
- generates a random number a
- calculates A = g^a modulo p
- sends A to Bob
Meanwhile Bob:
- generates a random number b
- calculates B = g^b modulo p
- sends B to Alice
Now Alice and Bob can both calculate the shared secret s =
g^(ab). Alice knows a and B, so she
calculates s = B^a. Bob knows A and b
so he calculates s = A^b.
An eavesdropper will know p and g since these
are made public, and can intercept A and B but,
short of solving the discrete log problem, these do
not let him or her discover the secret s.
- Digital signature
- Sender:
- calculates a message digest of a document
- encrypts the digest with his or her private key, using some
public key cryptosystem.
- attaches the encrypted digest to the document as a signature
Receiver:
- calculates a digest of the document (not including the signature)
- decrypts the signature with the signer's public key
- verifies that the two results are identical
If the public-key system is secure and the verification succeeds,
then the receiver knows
- that the document was not altered between signing and verification
- that the signer had access to the private key
Such an encrypted message digest can be treated as a signature since
it cannot be created without both the document and
the private key which only the sender should possess. The
legal issues are complex, but several countries are moving in the
direction of legal recognition for digital signatures.
- discrete logarithm problem
- The problem of finding logarithms in a finite field. Given a field
defintion (such definitions always include some operation analogous to
multiplication) and two numbers, a base and a target, find the power
which the base must be raised to in order to yield the target.
The discrete log problem is the basis of several cryptographic
systems, including the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
used in the IKE protocol. The useful property is
that exponentiation is relatively easy but the inverse operation,
finding the logarithm, is hard. The cryptosystems are designed so that
the user does only easy operations (exponentiation in the field) but an
attacker must solve the hard problem (discrete log) to crack the
system.
There are several variants of the problem for different types of
field. The IKE/Oakley key determination protocol uses two variants,
either over a field modulo a prime or over a field defined by an
elliptic curve. We give an example modulo a prime below. For the
elliptic curve version, consult an advanced text such as
Handbook of Applied Cryptography.
Given a prime p, a generator g for the field
modulo that prime, and a number x in the field, the problem
is to find y such that g^y = x.
For example, let p = 13. The field is then the integers from 0 to 12.
Any integer equals one of these modulo 13. That is, the remainder when
any integer is divided by 13 must be one of these.
2 is a generator for this field. That is, the powers of two modulo 13
run through all the non-zero numbers in the field. Modulo 13 we have:
y x
2^0 == 1
2^1 == 2
2^2 == 4
2^3 == 8
2^4 == 3 that is, the remainder from 16/13 is 3
2^5 == 6 the remainder from 32/13 is 6
2^6 == 12 and so on
2^7 == 11
2^8 == 9
2^9 == 5
2^10 == 10
2^11 == 7
2^12 == 1
Exponentiation in such a field is not difficult. Given, say,
y = 11,calculating x = 7is straightforward. One
method is just to calculate 2^11 = 2048,then
2048 mod 13 == 7.When the field is modulo a large prime (say a
few 100 digits) you need a silghtly cleverer method and even that is
moderately expensive in computer time, but the calculation is still not
problematic in any basic way.
The discrete log problem is the reverse. In our example, given
x = 7,find the logarithm y = 11.When the field
is modulo a large prime (or is based on a suitable elliptic curve),
this is indeed problematic. No solution method that is not
catastrophically expensive is known. Quite a few mathematicians have
tackled this problem. No efficient method has been found and
mathematicians do not expect that one will be. It seems likely no
efficient solution to either of the main variants the discrete log
problem exists.
Note, however, that no-one has proven such methods do not exist. If a
solution to either variant were found, the security of any crypto
system using that variant would be destroyed. This is one reason
IKE supports two variants. If one is broken, we can switch to the
other.
- discretionary access control
- access control mechanisms controlled by the user, for example Unix
rwx file permissions. These contrast with
mandatory access controls.
- DNS
- Domain Name Service, a distributed database
through which names are associated with numeric addresses and other
information in the Internet Protocol Suite. See also the
DNS background section of our documentation.
- DOS attack
- see Denial Of Service attack
- dynamic IP address
- an IP address which is automatically assigned, either by
DHCP or by some protocol such as PPP or
PPPoE which the machine uses to connect to the Internet. This is
the opposite of a static IP address, pre-set on
the machine itself.
- E
- EAR
- The US government's Export Administration R
egulations, administered by the Bureau of Export
Administration. These have replaced the earlier
ITAR regulations as the controls on export of cryptography.
- ECB mode
- Electronic CodeBook mode, the simplest way to
use a block cipher. See Cipher Modes.
- EDE
- The sequence of operations normally used in either the three-key
variant of triple DES used in
IPsec or the two-key variant used in some other
systems.
The sequence is:
- Encrypt with key1
- Decrypt with key2
- Encrypt with key3
For the two-key version, key1=key3.
The "advantage" of this EDE order of operations is that it makes it
simple to interoperate with older devices offering only single DES. Set
key1=key2=key3 and you have the worst of both worlds, the overhead of
triple DES with the "security" of single DES. Since both the
security of single DES and the overheads of triple DES are
seriously inferior to many other ciphers, this is a spectacularly
dubious "advantage".
- Entrust
- A Canadian company offerring enterprise PKI
products using CAST-128 symmetric crypto,
RSA public key and X.509 directories.
Web site
- EFF
- Electronic Frontier Foundation, an
advocacy group for civil rights in cyberspace.
- Encryption
- Techniques for converting a readable message (
plaintext) into apparently random material (
ciphertext) which cannot be read if intercepted. A key is required
to read the message.
Major variants include symmetric encryption
in which sender and receiver use the same secret key and
public key methods in which the sender uses one of a matched pair
of keys and the receiver uses the other. Many current systems,
including IPsec, are hybrids
combining the two techniques.
- ESP
- Encapsulated Security Payload, the
IPsec protocol which provides encryption.
It can also provide authentication
service and may be used with null encryption (which we do not
recommend). For details see our IPsec
document and/or RFC 2406.
- Extruded subnet
- A situation in which something IP sees as one network is actually in
two or more places.
For example, the Internet may route all traffic for a particular
company to that firm's corporate gateway. It then becomes the company's
problem to get packets to various machines on their
subnets in various departments. They may decide to treat a branch
office like a subnet, giving it IP addresses "on" their corporate net.
This becomes an extruded subnet.
Packets bound for it are delivered to the corporate gateway, since as
far as the outside world is concerned, that subnet is part of the
corporate network. However, instead of going onto the corporate LAN (as
they would for, say, the accounting department) they are then
encapsulated and sent back onto the Internet for delivery to the branch
office.
For information on doing this with Linux FreeS/WAN, look in our
advanced configuration section.
- Exhaustive search
- See brute force attack.
- F
- FIPS
- Federal Information Processing Standard,
the US government's standards for products it buys. These are issued by NIST. Among other things, DES and
SHA are defined in FIPS documents. NIST have a
FIPS home page.
- Free Software Foundation (FSF)
- An organisation to promote free software, free in the sense of these
quotes from their web pages
"Free software" is a matter of liberty, not price. To
understand the concept, you should think of "free speech", not "free
beer."
"Free software" refers to the users' freedom to run, copy,
distribute, study, change and improve the software.
See also GNU, GNU General Public
License, and the FSF site.
- FreeS/WAN
- see Linux FreeS/WAN
- Fullnet
- The CIDR block containing all IPs of its IP version. The
IPv4 fullnet is written 0.0.0.0/0. Also known as "all" and
"default", fullnet may be used in a routing table to specify a default
route, and in a FreeS/WAN
policy group file to specify a default IPsec policy.
- FSF
- see Free software Foundation
- G
- GCHQ
- Government Communications
Headquarters, the British organisation for
signals intelligence.
- generator of a prime field
- see discrete logarithm problem
- GILC
- Global Internet Liberty Campaign,
an international organisation advocating, among other things, free
availability of cryptography. They have a
campaign to remove cryptographic software from the
Wassenaar Arrangement.
- Global Internet Liberty Campaign
- see GILC.
- Global Trust Register
- An attempt to create something like a root CA
for PGP by publishing both
as a book and
on the web the fingerprints of a set of verified keys for
well-known users and organisations.
- GMP
- The GNU Multi-Precision library code, used in
Linux FreeS/WAN by Pluto for
public key calculations. See the
GMP home page.
- GNU
- GNU's Not Unix, the Free
Software Foundation's project aimed at creating a free system with
at least the capabilities of Unix. Linux uses GNU
utilities extensively.
- GOST
- a Soviet government standard block cipher.
Applied Cryptography has details.
- GPG
- see GNU Privacy Guard
- GNU General Public License(GPL, copyleft)
- The license developed by the Free Software Foundation
under which Linux,
Linux FreeS/WAN and many other pieces of software are distributed.
The license allows anyone to redistribute and modify the code, but
forbids anyone from distributing executables without providing access
to source code. For more details see the file
COPYING included with GPLed source distributions, including ours,
or the GNU site's GPL
page.
- GNU Privacy Guard
- An open source implementation of Open PGP as
defined in RFC 2440. See their web site
- GPL
- see GNU General Public License.
- H
- Hash
- see message digest
- Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
- using keyed message digest functions to
authenticate a message. This differs from other uses of these
functions:
- In normal usage, the hash function's internal variable are
initialised in some standard way. Anyone can reproduce the hash to
check that the message has not been altered.
- For HMAC usage, you initialise the internal variables from the key.
Only someone with the key can reproduce the hash. A successful check of
the hash indicates not only that the message is unchanged but also that
the creator knew the key.
The exact techniques used in IPsec are defined
in RFC 2104. They are referred to as HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96
because they output only 96 bits of the hash. This makes some attacks
on the hash functions harder.
- HMAC
- see Hashed Message Authentication Code
- HMAC-MD5-96
- see Hashed Message Authentication Code
- HMAC-SHA-96
- see Hashed Message Authentication Code
- Hybrid cryptosystem
- A system using both public key and
symmetric cipher techniques. This works well. Public key methods
provide key management and digital signature
facilities which are not readily available using symmetric ciphers. The
symmetric cipher, however, can do the bulk of the encryption work much
more efficiently than public key methods.
- I
- IAB
- Internet Architecture Board.
- ICMP
- Internet Control M
essage Protocol. This is used for various IP-connected
devices to manage the network.
- IDEA
- International Data Encrypion Algorithm,
developed in Europe as an alternative to exportable American ciphers
such as DES which were
too weak for serious use. IDEA is a block cipher
using 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys, and is used in products such as
PGP.
IDEA is not required by the IPsec RFCs and not
currently used in Linux FreeS/WAN.
IDEA is patented and, with strictly limited exceptions for personal
use, using it requires a license from
Ascom.
- IEEE
- Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers, a professional association which, among other things,
sets some technical standards
- IESG
- Internet Engineering Steering Group
.
- IETF
- Internet Engineering Task Force,
the umbrella organisation whose various working groups make most of the
technical decisions for the Internet. The IETF
IPsec working group wrote the RFCs we
are implementing.
- IKE
- Internet Key Exchange, based on the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. For details, see RFC 2409 and
our IPsec document. IKE is implemented in
Linux FreeS/WAN by the Pluto daemon.
- IKE v2
- A proposed replacement for IKE. There are other
candidates, such as JFK, and at time of writing
(March 2002) the choice between them has not yet been made and does not
appear imminent.
- iOE
- See Initiate-only opportunistic encryption
.
- IP
- Internet Protocol.
- IP masquerade
- A mostly obsolete term for a method of allowing multiple machines to
communicate over the Internet when only one IP address is available for
their use. The more current term is Network Address Translation or
NAT.
- IPng
- "IP the Next Generation", see IPv6.
- IPv4
- The current version of the Internet protocol suite
.
- IPv6 (IPng)
- Version six of the Internet protocol suite,
currently being developed. It will replace the current
version four. IPv6 has IPsec as a mandatory
component.
See this
web site for more details, and our
compatibility document for information on FreeS/WAN and the Linux
implementation of IPv6.
- IPsec or IPSEC
- Internet Protocol SECurity, security functions
(authentication and
encryption) implemented at the IP level of the protocol stack. It
is optional for IPv4 and mandatory for
IPv6.
This is the standard Linux FreeS/WAN
is implementing. For more details, see our IPsec
Overview. For the standards, see RFCs listed in our
RFCs document.
- IPX
- Novell's Netware protocol tunnelled over an IP link. Our
firewalls document includes an example of using this through an
IPsec tunnel.
- ISAKMP
- Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol, defined in RFC 2408.
- ITAR
- International Traffic in Arms R
egulations, US regulations administered by the State Department which
until recently limited export of, among other things, cryptographic
technology and software. ITAR still exists, but the limits on
cryptography have now been transferred to the Export
Administration Regulations under the Commerce Department's
Bureau of Export Administration.
- IV
- see Initialisation vector
- Initialisation Vector (IV)
- Some cipher modes, including the
CBC mode which IPsec uses, require some extra data at the
beginning. This data is called the initialisation vector. It need not
be secret, but should be different for each message. Its function is to
prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the
same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best
prevented.
- Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)
- A form of opportunistic encryption (OE) in
which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse
DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection
requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the
system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map
for the host's external IP.
Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described
in our quickstart document.
- J
- JFK
- Just Fast Keying,
a proposed simpler replacement for IKE.
- K
- Kernel
- The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls
the hardware and provides services to all other programs.
In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.
2.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number
as in 2.3.x indicates an experimental or development
kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the
production series. The development kernels are primarily for people
doing kernel development. Others should consider using development
kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet
available in production kernels.
- Keyed message digest
- See HMAC.
- Key length
- see brute force attack
- KLIPS
- Kernel IP Security, the
Linux FreeS/WAN project's changes to the Linux
kernel to support the IPsec protocols.
- L
- LDAP
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored
in directories. LDAP is used by several PKI
implementations, often with X.501 directories and X.509
certificates. It may also be used by IPsec to
obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented
in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- LIBDES
- A publicly available library of DES code, written
by Eric Young, which Linux FreeS/WAN
uses in both KLIPS and Pluto.
- Linux
- A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel
originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student
Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the
GNU utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many
others led to explosive growth.
Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU
architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC
and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple
CPUs on some architectures.
Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to run on
all CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our
compatibility section for a list.
- Linux FreeS/WAN
- Our implementation of the IPsec protocols,
intended to be freely redistributable source code with a
GNU GPL license and no constraints under US or other
export laws. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other IPsec implementations. The name is partly taken, with
permission, from the S/WAN multi-vendor IPsec
compatibility effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,
KLIPS (KerneL IPsec Support) and the Pluto
daemon which manages the whole thing.
See our IPsec section for more detail. For
the code see our primary site or one
of the mirror sites on this list.
- Linux Security Modules (LSM)
- a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports
plug-in modules for various security policies.
This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches
to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular
approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing
Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were
incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your
houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".
It seems to be working. There is a fairly active
LSM mailing list, and several projects are already using the
interface.
- LSM
- see Linux Security Modules
- M
- Mailing list
- The Linux FreeS/WAN project has
several public email lists for bug reports and software development
discussions. See our document on mailing lists.
- Man-in-the-middle attack
- An active attack in which the attacker
impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other.
For example, if Alice and Bob are negotiating
a key via the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and are
not using authentication to be certain
they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself
in the communication path can deceive both players.
Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For
Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated,
Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key
they have is Alice-to-Bob.
A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it,
reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key
and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply
which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.
To make this attack effective, Mallory must
- subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out
the deception
possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server,
...
- beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use
strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why
IKE requires authentication
- work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay
large enough to alert the victims
not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some
situations.
If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to
read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge
anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication
completely.
- mandatory access control
- access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see
discretionary access control), but are enforced by the system.
For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable
only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra.
Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries.
For example, even if you can read it, you should not be ion is to
prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the
same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best
prevented.
- Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)
- A form of opportunistic encryption (OE) in
which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse
DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection
requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the
system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map
for the host's external IP.
Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described
in our quickstart document.
- J
- JFK
- Just Fast Keying,
a proposed simpler replacement for IKE.
- K
- Kernel
- The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls
the hardware and provides services to all other programs.
In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.
2.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number
as in 2.3.x indicates an experimental or development
kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the
production series. The development kernels are primarily for people
doing kernel development. Others should consider using development
kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet
available in production kernels.
- Keyed message digest
- See HMAC.
- Key length
- see brute force attack
- KLIPS
- Kernel IP Security, the
Linux FreeS/WAN project's changes to the Linux
kernel to support the IPsec protocols.
- L
- LDAP
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored
in directories. LDAP is used by several PKI
implementations, often with X.501 directories and X.509
certificates. It may also be used by IPsec to
obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented
in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- LIBDES
- A publicly available library of DES code, written
by Eric Young, which Linux FreeS/WAN
uses in both KLIPS and Pluto.
- Linux
- A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel
originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student
Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the
GNU utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many
others led to explosive growth.
Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU
architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC
and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple
CPUs on some architectures.
Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to run on
all CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our
compatibility section for a list.
- Linux FreeS/WAN
- Our implementation of the IPsec protocols,
intended to be freely redistributable source code with a
GNU GPL license and no constraints under US or other
export laws. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other IPsec implementations. The name is partly taken, with
permission, from the S/WAN multi-vendor IPsec
compatibility effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,
KLIPS (KerneL IPsec Support) and the Pluto
daemon which manages the whole thing.
See our IPsec section for more detail. For
the code see our primary site or one
of the mirror sites on this list.
- Linux Security Modules (LSM)
- a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports
plug-in modules for various security policies.
This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches
to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular
approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing
Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were
incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your
houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".
It seems to be working. There is a fairly active
LSM mailing list, and several projects are already using the
interface.
- LSM
- see Linux Security Modules
- M
- Mailing list
- The Linux FreeS/WAN project has
several public email lists for bug reports and software development
discussions. See our document on mailing lists.
- Man-in-the-middle attack
- An active attack in which the attacker
impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other.
For example, if Alice and Bob are negotiating
a key via the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and are
not using authentication to be certain
they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself
in the communication path can deceive both players.
Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For
Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated,
Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key
they have is Alice-to-Bob.
A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it,
reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key
and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply
which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.
To make this attack effective, Mallory must
- subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out
the deception
possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server,
...
- beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use
strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why
IKE requires authentication
- work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay
large enough to alert the victims
not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some
situations.
If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to
read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge
anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication
completely.
- mandatory access control
- access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see
discretionary access control), but are enforced by the system.
For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable
only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra.
Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries.
For example, even if you can read it, you should not be ion is to
prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the
same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best
prevented.
- Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)
- A form of opportunistic encryption (OE) in
which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse
DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection
requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the
system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map
for the host's external IP.
Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described
in our quickstart document.
- J
- JFK
- Just Fast Keying,
a proposed simpler replacement for IKE.
- K
- Kernel
- The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls
the hardware and provides services to all other programs.
In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.
2.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number
as in 2.3.x indicates an experimental or development
kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the
production series. The development kernels are primarily for people
doing kernel development. Others should consider using development
kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet
available in production kernels.
- Keyed message digest
- See HMAC.
- Key length
- see brute force attack
- KLIPS
- Kernel IP Security, the
Linux FreeS/WAN project's changes to the Linux
kernel to support the IPsec protocols.
- L
- LDAP
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored
in directories. LDAP is used by several PKI
implementations, often with X.501 directories and X.509
certificates. It may also be used by IPsec to
obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented
in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- LIBDES
- A publicly available library of DES code, written
by Eric Young, which Linux FreeS/WAN
uses in both KLIPS and Pluto.
- Linux
- A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel
originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student
Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the
GNU utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many
others led to explosive growth.
Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU
architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC
and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple
CPUs on some architectures.
Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to run on
all CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our
compatibility section for a list.
- Linux FreeS/WAN
- Our implementation of the IPsec protocols,
intended to be freely redistributable source code with a
GNU GPL license and no constraints under US or other
export laws. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other IPsec implementations. The name is partly taken, with
permission, from the S/WAN multi-vendor IPsec
compatibility effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,
KLIPS (KerneL IPsec Support) and the Pluto
daemon which manages the whole thing.
See our IPsec section for more detail. For
the code see our primary site or one
of the mirror sites on this list.
- Linux Security Modules (LSM)
- a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports
plug-in modules for various security policies.
This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches
to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular
approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing
Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were
incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your
houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".
It seems to be working. There is a fairly active
LSM mailing list, and several projects are already using the
interface.
- LSM
- see Linux Security Modules
- M
- Mailing list
- The Linux FreeS/WAN project has
several public email lists for bug reports and software development
discussions. See our document on mailing lists.
- Man-in-the-middle attack
- An active attack in which the attacker
impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other.
For example, if Alice and Bob are negotiating
a key via the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and are
not using authentication to be certain
they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself
in the communication path can deceive both players.
Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For
Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated,
Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key
they have is Alice-to-Bob.
A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it,
reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key
and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply
which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.
To make this attack effective, Mallory must
- subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out
the deception
possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server,
...
- beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use
strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why
IKE requires authentication
- work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay
large enough to alert the victims
not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some
situations.
If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to
read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge
anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication
completely.
- mandatory access control
- access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see
discretionary access control), but are enforced by the system.
For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable
only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra.
Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries.
For example, even if you can read it, you should not be ion is to
prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the
same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best
prevented.
- Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)
- A form of opportunistic encryption (OE) in
which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse
DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection
requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the
system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map
for the host's external IP.
Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described
in our quickstart document.
- J
- JFK
- Just Fast Keying,
a proposed simpler replacement for IKE.
- K
- Kernel
- The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls
the hardware and provides services to all other programs.
In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.
2.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number
as in 2.3.x indicates an experimental or development
kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the
production series. The development kernels are primarily for people
doing kernel development. Others should consider using development
kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet
available in production kernels.
- Keyed message digest
- See HMAC.
- Key length
- see brute force attack
- KLIPS
- Kernel IP Security, the
Linux FreeS/WAN project's changes to the Linux
kernel to support the IPsec protocols.
- L
- LDAP
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored
in directories. LDAP is used by several PKI
implementations, often with X.501 directories and X.509
certificates. It may also be used by IPsec to
obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented
in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- LIBDES
- A publicly available library of DES code, written
by Eric Young, which Linux FreeS/WAN
uses in both KLIPS and Pluto.
- Linux
- A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel
originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student
Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the
GNU utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many
others led to explosive growth.
Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU
architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC
and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple
CPUs on some architectures.
Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to run on
all CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our
compatibility section for a list.
- Linux FreeS/WAN
- Our implementation of the IPsec protocols,
intended to be freely redistributable source code with a
GNU GPL license and no constraints under US or other
export laws. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other IPsec implementations. The name is partly taken, with
permission, from the S/WAN multi-vendor IPsec
compatibility effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,
KLIPS (KerneL IPsec Support) and the Pluto
daemon which manages the whole thing.
See our IPsec section for more detail. For
the code see our primary site or one
of the mirror sites on this list.
- Linux Security Modules (LSM)
- a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports
plug-in modules for various security policies.
This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches
to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular
approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing
Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were
incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your
houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".
It seems to be working. There is a fairly active
LSM mailing list, and several projects are already using the
interface.
- LSM
- see Linux Security Modules
- M
- Mailing list
- The Linux FreeS/WAN project has
several public email lists for bug reports and software development
discussions. See our document on mailing lists.
- Man-in-the-middle attack
- An active attack in which the attacker
impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other.
For example, if Alice and Bob are negotiating
a key via the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and are
not using authentication to be certain
they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself
in the communication path can deceive both players.
Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For
Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated,
Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key
they have is Alice-to-Bob.
A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it,
reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key
and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply
which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.
To make this attack effective, Mallory must
- subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out
the deception
possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server,
...
- beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use
strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why
IKE requires authentication
- work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay
large enough to alert the victims
not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some
situations.
If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to
read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge
anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication
completely.
- mandatory access control
- access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see
discretionary access control), but are enforced by the system.
For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable
only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra.
Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries.
For example, even if you can read it, you should not be ion is to
prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the
same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best
prevented.
- Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)
- A form of opportunistic encryption (OE) in
which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse
DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection
requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the
system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map
for the host's external IP.
Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described
in our quickstart document.
- J
- JFK
- Just Fast Keying,
a proposed simpler replacement for IKE.
- K
- Kernel
- The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls
the hardware and provides services to all other programs.
In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.
2.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number
as in 2.3.x indicates an experimental or development
kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the
production series. The development kernels are primarily for people
doing kernel development. Others should consider using development
kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet
available in production kernels.
- Keyed message digest
- See HMAC.
- Key length
- see brute force attack
- KLIPS
- Kernel IP Security, the
Linux FreeS/WAN project's changes to the Linux
kernel to support the IPsec protocols.
- L
- LDAP
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored
in directories. LDAP is used by several PKI
implementations, often with X.501 directories and X.509
certificates. It may also be used by IPsec to
obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented
in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- LIBDES
- A publicly available library of DES code, written
by Eric Young, which Linux FreeS/WAN
uses in both KLIPS and Pluto.
- Linux
- A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel
originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student
Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the
GNU utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many
others led to explosive growth.
Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU
architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC
and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple
CPUs on some architectures.
Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to run on
all CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our
compatibility section for a list.
- Linux FreeS/WAN
- Our implementation of the IPsec protocols,
intended to be freely redistributable source code with a
GNU GPL license and no constraints under US or other
export laws. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other IPsec implementations. The name is partly taken, with
permission, from the S/WAN multi-vendor IPsec
compatibility effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,
KLIPS (KerneL IPsec Support) and the Pluto
daemon which manages the whole thing.
See our IPsec section for more detail. For
the code see our primary site or one
of the mirror sites on this list.
- Linux Security Modules (LSM)
- a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports
plug-in modules for various security policies.
This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches
to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular
approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing
Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were
incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your
houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".
It seems to be working. There is a fairly active
LSM mailing list, and several projects are already using the
interface.
- LSM
- see Linux Security Modules
- M
- Mailing list
- The Linux FreeS/WAN project has
several public email lists for bug reports and software development
discussions. See our document on mailing lists.
- Man-in-the-middle attack
- An active attack in which the attacker
impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other.
For example, if Alice and Bob are negotiating
a key via the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and are
not using authentication to be certain
they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself
in the communication path can deceive both players.
Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For
Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated,
Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key
they have is Alice-to-Bob.
A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it,
reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key
and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply
which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.
To make this attack effective, Mallory must
- subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out
the deception
possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server,
...
- beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use
strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why
IKE requires authentication
- work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay
large enough to alert the victims
not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some
situations.
If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to
read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge
anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication
completely.
- mandatory access control
- access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see
discretionary access control), but are enforced by the system.
For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable
only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra.
Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries.
For example, even if you can read it, you should not be ion is to
prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the
same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best
prevented.
- Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)
- A form of opportunistic encryption (OE) in
which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse
DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection
requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the
system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map
for the host's external IP.
Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described
in our quickstart document.
- J
- JFK
- Just Fast Keying,
a proposed simpler replacement for IKE.
- K
- Kernel
- The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls
the hardware and provides services to all other programs.
In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.
2.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number
as in 2.3.x indicates an experimental or development
kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the
production series. The development kernels are primarily for people
doing kernel development. Others should consider using development
kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet
available in production kernels.
- Keyed message digest
- See HMAC.
- Key length
- see brute force attack
- KLIPS
- Kernel IP Security, the
Linux FreeS/WAN project's changes to the Linux
kernel to support the IPsec protocols.
- L
- LDAP
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored
in directories. LDAP is used by several PKI
implementations, often with X.501 directories and X.509
certificates. It may also be used by IPsec to
obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented
in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- LIBDES
- A publicly available library of DES code, written
by Eric Young, which Linux FreeS/WAN
uses in both KLIPS and Pluto.
- Linux
- A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel
originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student
Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the
GNU utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many
others led to explosive growth.
Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU
architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC
and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple
CPUs on some architectures.
Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to run on
all CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our
compatibility section for a list.
- Linux FreeS/WAN
- Our implementation of the IPsec protocols,
intended to be freely redistributable source code with a
GNU GPL license and no constraints under US or other
export laws. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other IPsec implementations. The name is partly taken, with
permission, from the S/WAN multi-vendor IPsec
compatibility effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,
KLIPS (KerneL IPsec Support) and the Pluto
daemon which manages the whole thing.
See our IPsec section for more detail. For
the code see our primary site or one
of the mirror sites on this list.
- Linux Security Modules (LSM)
- a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports
plug-in modules for various security policies.
This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches
to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular
approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing
Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were
incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your
houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".
It seems to be working. There is a fairly active
LSM mailing list, and several projects are already using the
interface.
- LSM
- see Linux Security Modules
- M
- Mailing list
- The Linux FreeS/WAN project has
several public email lists for bug reports and software development
discussions. See our document on mailing lists.
- Man-in-the-middle attack
- An active attack in which the attacker
impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other.
For example, if Alice and Bob are negotiating
a key via the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and are
not using authentication to be certain
they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself
in the communication path can deceive both players.
Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For
Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated,
Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key
they have is Alice-to-Bob.
A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it,
reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key
and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply
which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.
To make this attack effective, Mallory must
- subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out
the deception
possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server,
...
- beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use
strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why
IKE requires authentication
- work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay
large enough to alert the victims
not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some
situations.
If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to
read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge
anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication
completely.
- mandatory access control
- access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see
discretionary access control), but are enforced by the system.
For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable
only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra.
Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries.
For example, even if you can read it, you should not be ion is to
prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the
same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best
prevented.
- Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)
- A form of opportunistic encryption (OE) in
which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse
DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection
requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the
system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map
for the host's external IP.
Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described
in our quickstart document.
- J
- JFK
- Just Fast Keying,
a proposed simpler replacement for IKE.
- K
- Kernel
- The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls
the hardware and provides services to all other programs.
In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.
2.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number
as in 2.3.x indicates an experimental or development
kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the
production series. The development kernels are primarily for people
doing kernel development. Others should consider using development
kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet
available in production kernels.
- Keyed message digest
- See HMAC.
- Key length
- see brute force attack
- KLIPS
- Kernel IP Security, the
Linux FreeS/WAN project's changes to the Linux
kernel to support the IPsec protocols.
- L
- LDAP
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored
in directories. LDAP is used by several PKI
implementations, often with X.501 directories and X.509
certificates. It may also be used by IPsec to
obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented
in Linux FreeS/WAN.
- LIBDES
- A publicly available library of DES code, written
by Eric Young, which Linux FreeS/WAN
uses in both KLIPS and Pluto.
- Linux
- A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel
originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student
Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the
GNU utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many
others led to explosive growth.
Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU
architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC
and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple
CPUs on some architectures.
Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to run on
all CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our
compatibility section for a list.
- Linux FreeS/WAN
- Our implementation of the IPsec protocols,
intended to be freely redistributable source code with a
GNU GPL license and no constraints under US or other
export laws. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other IPsec implementations. The name is partly taken, with
permission, from the S/WAN multi-vendor IPsec
compatibility effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,
KLIPS (KerneL IPsec Support) and the Pluto
daemon which manages the whole thing.
See our IPsec section for more detail. For
the code see our primary site or one
of the mirror sites on this list.
- Linux Security Modules (LSM)
- a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports
plug-in modules for various security policies.
This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches
to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular
approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing
Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were
incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your
houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".
It seems to be working. There is a fairly active
LSM mailing list, and several projects are already using the
interface.
- LSM
- see Linux Security Modules
- M
- Mailing list
- The Linux FreeS/WAN project has
several public email lists for bug reports and software development
discussions. See our document on mailing lists.
- Man-in-the-middle attack
- An active attack in which the attacker
impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other.
For example, if Alice and Bob are negotiating
a key via the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and are
not using authentication to be certain
they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself
in the communication path can deceive both players.
Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For
Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated,
Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key
they have is Alice-to-Bob.
A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it,
reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key
and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply
which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.
To make this attack effective, Mallory must
- subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out
the deception
possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server,
...
- beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use
strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why
IKE requires authentication
- work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay
large enough to alert the victims
not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some
situations.
If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to
read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge
anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication
completely.
- mandatory access control
- access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see
discretionary access control), but are enforced by the system.
For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable
only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra.
Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries.
For example, even if you can read it, you should not be ion is to
prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the
same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best
prevented.
- Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)
- A form of opportunistic encryption (OE) in
which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse
DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection
requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the
system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map
for the host's external IP.
Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described
in our quickstart document.
- J
- JFK
- Just Fast Keying,
a proposed simpler replacement for IKE.
- K
- Kernel
- The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls
the hardware and provides services to all other programs.
In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.
2.x indicates a stable or production